Simulating terrorism: Credible commitment, costly signaling, and strategic behavior

Journal Article (Journal Article)

We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce-resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations. © 2009 The American Political Science Association.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Siegel, DA; Young, JK

Published Date

  • October 1, 2009

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 42 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 765 - 771

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1537-5935

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1049-0965

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1017/S1049096509990151

Citation Source

  • Scopus