Substance vs. procedure: Constitutional enforcement and constitutional choice


Journal Article

The constitutional political economy research program established by Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan provides a rigorous analytical framework for the analysis of constitutional choice. I focus on two issues that have received only limited attention in the CPE literature: the problem of constitutional enforcement and the role of judicial review. I demonstrate that incorporating a concern for enforcement into constitutional analysis has significant implications for the the choice among rules, and suggests that procedural constitutional constraints have significant advantages over constitutional norms that attempt to secure broader, substantive values. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Vanberg, G

Published Date

  • October 1, 2011

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 80 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 309 - 318

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-2681

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.030

Citation Source

  • Scopus