Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament
Balance of Power versus Collective Security: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Publication
, Chapter
Niou, E; Ordeshook, PC
1996
Duke Scholars
Publication Date
1996
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Citation
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Niou, E., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1996). Balance of Power versus Collective Security: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. In J. Melvin L Best (Ed.), Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Niou, E., and P. C. Ordeshook. “Balance of Power versus Collective Security: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.” In Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament, edited by Jr Melvin L Best. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
Niou E, Ordeshook PC. Balance of Power versus Collective Security: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. In: Melvin L Best J, editor. Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament. Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1996.
Niou, E., and P. C. Ordeshook. “Balance of Power versus Collective Security: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.” Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament, edited by Jr Melvin L Best, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
Niou E, Ordeshook PC. Balance of Power versus Collective Security: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. In: Melvin L Best J, editor. Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament. Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1996.
Publication Date
1996
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers