Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Published

Journal Article

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a contract with higher utility for the center at an arbitrarily small loss of her own utility, the QVA is the only mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof, selects stable outcomes, and is Pareto efficient. For general continuous utility functions, a variant of the QVA involving fixed tie-breaking is strategy-proof and also selects stable outcomes. However, there is no mechanism in this setting that in addition also selects Pareto efficient outcomes. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • De Weerdt, MM; Harrenstein, P; Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • January 1, 2014

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 86 /

Start / End Page

  • 405 - 420

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1090-2473

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0899-8256

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001

Citation Source

  • Scopus