False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

Published

Journal Article

In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, agents can participate in a mechanism multiple times under different identities. A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once. Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results. In this paper, we show how some of these negative results can be circumvented by making the realistic assumption that obtaining additional identities comes at a (potentially small) cost. We consider arbitrary such costs and apply our results within the context of a voting model with two alternatives. © 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Wagman, L; Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • January 1, 2014

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 43 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 599 - 618

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0020-7276

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3

Citation Source

  • Scopus