False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
Journal Article
In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, agents can participate in a mechanism multiple times under different identities. A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once. Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results. In this paper, we show how some of these negative results can be circumvented by making the realistic assumption that obtaining additional identities comes at a (potentially small) cost. We consider arbitrary such costs and apply our results within the context of a voting model with two alternatives. © 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Full Text
Duke Authors
Cited Authors
- Wagman, L; Conitzer, V
Published Date
- January 1, 2014
Published In
Volume / Issue
- 43 / 3
Start / End Page
- 599 - 618
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
- 0020-7276
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
- 10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3
Citation Source
- Scopus