"John Marshall has made his decision": Implementation, transparency, and public support

Published

Book Section

© 2006 by the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. Institutional games involve more than how the U.S. Supreme Court makes its decisions and whether it defers to Congress. Supreme Court justices, like judges in other courts, enjoy few means to enforce their decisions. If judicial rulings depend on cooperation from other actors, including legislatures and administrative agencies, for their implementation, courts face a potential compliance problem. This essay presents a simple game-theoretic model to analyze legislativejudicial relations against the backdrop of this problem. It provides a unified theoretical account that explains a number of seemingly contradictory findings on judicial implementation in the United States. The theory provides a basis for understanding prominent examples of noncompliance while explaining why compliance will be the rule rather than the exception. The theory also demonstrates how and when potential enforcement problems will influence judicial behavior, which generates comparative implications about the circumstances under which courts constitute powerful constraints on the other political actors.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Vanberg, G

Published Date

  • October 5, 2012

Book Title

  • Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court

Start / End Page

  • 89 - 116

International Standard Book Number 13 (ISBN-13)

  • 9780813925271

Citation Source

  • Scopus