Legislative-judicial relations: A game-theoretic approach to constitutional review


Journal Article

This article develops an imperfect information model of the interactions between legislatures and constitutional courts. The model addresses legislative anticipation of judicial review, legislative reactions to judicial rulings, and the impact of anticipation of such reactions on judicial behavior. The most important finding is that the nature of legislative-judicial relations depends crucially on the political environment in which court and legislature must act, as well as on judicial preferences. Several results are tested in a logit analysis of decisions by the German Constitutional Court from 1983 to 1995.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Vanberg, G

Published Date

  • January 1, 2001

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 45 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 346 - 361

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0092-5853

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.2307/2669345

Citation Source

  • Scopus