Welfare Consequences of the Six-Year Presidential Term Evaluated in the Context of a Model of the U.S. Economy
We evaluate the six-year presidential term proposal in the context of a model of the U.S. economy characterized by a short-run but not a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Votes and public welfare are separately conceptualized as functions of inflation and unemployment, which are indirectly controlled by the president through manipulation of government spending. In a series of simulation experiments, the vote-maximizing choice of policy instruments led to less we(fare loss with six- than with four-year terms under most conditions. Ironically, vote maximizing was shown to lead not only to short- and long-term welfare loss, but also to long-run political disadvantage. © 1983, American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
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