Mechanism design for scheduling with uncertain execution time

Published

Conference Paper

Copyright © 2014, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. We study the problem where a task (or multiple unrelated tasks) must be executed, there are multiple machines/agents that can potentially perform the task, and our objective is to minimize the expected sum of the agents' processing times. Each agent does not know exactly how long it will take him to finish the task; he only knows the distribution from which this lime is drawn. These times are independent across agents and the distributions fulfill the monotone hazard rate condition. Agents are selfish and will lie about their distributions if this increases their expected utility.We study different variations of the Vickrey mechanism that lake as input the agents' reported distributions and the players' realized running times and that output a schedule that minimizes the expected sum of processing times, as well as payments that make it an ex-post equilibrium for the agents to both truthfully report their distributions and exert full effort to complete the task. We devise the ChPE mechanism, which is uniquely tailored to our problem, and has many desirable properties including: not rewarding agents that fail to finish the task and having non-negative payments.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Conitzer, V; Vidali, A

Published Date

  • January 1, 2014

Published In

  • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volume / Issue

  • 1 /

Start / End Page

  • 623 - 629

International Standard Book Number 13 (ISBN-13)

  • 9781577356776

Citation Source

  • Scopus