Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations
Publication
, Journal Article
Cox, J; Ferri, F; Honigsberg, C; Thomas, R
Published in: Southern California Law Review
2016
Duke Scholars
Published In
Southern California Law Review
Publication Date
2016
Volume
89
Issue
6
Start / End Page
1175 / 1238
Related Subject Headings
- Law
- 1801 Law
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Cox, J., Ferri, F., Honigsberg, C., & Thomas, R. (2016). Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations. Southern California Law Review, 89(6), 1175–1238.
Cox, J., F. Ferri, C. Honigsberg, and R. Thomas. “Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations.” Southern California Law Review 89, no. 6 (2016): 1175–1238.
Cox J, Ferri F, Honigsberg C, Thomas R. Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations. Southern California Law Review. 2016;89(6):1175–238.
Cox, J., et al. “Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations.” Southern California Law Review, vol. 89, no. 6, 2016, pp. 1175–238.
Cox J, Ferri F, Honigsberg C, Thomas R. Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations. Southern California Law Review. 2016;89(6):1175–1238.
Published In
Southern California Law Review
Publication Date
2016
Volume
89
Issue
6
Start / End Page
1175 / 1238
Related Subject Headings
- Law
- 1801 Law