On the expressiveness of return-into-libc attacks

Published

Conference Paper

Return-into-libc (RILC) is one of the most common forms of code-reuse attacks. In this attack, an intruder uses a buffer overflow or other exploit to redirect control flow through existing (libc) functions within the legitimate program. While dangerous, it is generally considered limited in its expressive power since it only allows the attacker to execute straight-line code. In other words, RILC attacks are believed to be incapable of arbitrary computation-they are not Turing complete. Consequently, to address this limitation, researchers have developed other code-reuse techniques, such as return-oriented programming (ROP). In this paper, we make the counterargument and demonstrate that the original RILC technique is indeed Turing complete. Specifically, we present a generalized RILC attack called Turing complete RILC (TC-RILC) that allows for arbitrary computations. We demonstrate that TC-RILC satisfies formal requirements of Turing-completeness. In addition, because it depends on the well-defined semantics of libc functions, we also show that a TC-RILC attack can be portable between different versions (or even different families) of operating systems and naturally has negative implications for some existing anti-ROP defenses. The development of TC-RILC on both Linux and Windows platforms demonstrates the expressiveness and practicality of the generalized RILC attack. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Tran, M; Etheridge, M; Bletsch, T; Jiang, X; Freeh, V; Ning, P

Published Date

  • December 1, 2011

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 6961 LNCS /

Start / End Page

  • 121 - 141

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1611-3349

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0302-9743

International Standard Book Number 13 (ISBN-13)

  • 9783642236433

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/978-3-642-23644-0_7

Citation Source

  • Scopus