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Why do firms hedge? An asymmetric information model

Publication ,  Journal Article
Breeden, DT; Viswanathan, S
Published in: Journal of Fixed Income
December 1, 2016

Duke Scholars

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Published In

Journal of Fixed Income

DOI

ISSN

1059-8596

Publication Date

December 1, 2016

Volume

25

Issue

3

Start / End Page

7 / 25

Related Subject Headings

  • 3502 Banking, finance and investment
  • 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability
  • 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
  • 1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
 

Citation

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Breeden, D. T., & Viswanathan, S. (2016). Why do firms hedge? An asymmetric information model. Journal of Fixed Income, 25(3), 7–25. https://doi.org/10.3905/jfi.2016.25.3.007
Breeden, D. T., and S. Viswanathan. “Why do firms hedge? An asymmetric information model.” Journal of Fixed Income 25, no. 3 (December 1, 2016): 7–25. https://doi.org/10.3905/jfi.2016.25.3.007.
Breeden DT, Viswanathan S. Why do firms hedge? An asymmetric information model. Journal of Fixed Income. 2016 Dec 1;25(3):7–25.
Breeden, D. T., and S. Viswanathan. “Why do firms hedge? An asymmetric information model.” Journal of Fixed Income, vol. 25, no. 3, Dec. 2016, pp. 7–25. Scopus, doi:10.3905/jfi.2016.25.3.007.
Breeden DT, Viswanathan S. Why do firms hedge? An asymmetric information model. Journal of Fixed Income. 2016 Dec 1;25(3):7–25.

Published In

Journal of Fixed Income

DOI

ISSN

1059-8596

Publication Date

December 1, 2016

Volume

25

Issue

3

Start / End Page

7 / 25

Related Subject Headings

  • 3502 Banking, finance and investment
  • 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability
  • 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
  • 1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability