Frequent financial reporting and managerial myopia

Journal Article (Journal Article)

Using the transition of U.S. firms from annual reporting to semi-annual reporting and then to quarterly reporting over the period 1950-1970, we provide evidence on the effects of increased reporting frequency on firms' investment decisions. Estimates from difference-in-differences specifications indicate that increased reporting frequency is associated with an economically large decline in investments. Additional analyses reveal that the decline in investments is most consistent with frequent financial reporting inducing myopic management behavior. Our evidence informs the recent controversial debate about eliminating quarterly reporting for U.S. corporations.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Kraft, AG; Vashishtha, R; Venkatachalam, M

Published Date

  • March 1, 2018

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 93 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 249 - 275

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0001-4826

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.2308/accr-51838

Citation Source

  • Scopus