A plea for moral deference


Journal Article

It seems to be a commonplace of the philosophical literature that there is no such thing as moral expertise. Or perhaps, more narrowly, that there is no such thing as justified deference to moral expertise, when there is moral expertise. On the other hand, a warrant for moral deference seems to have a secure place in everyday moral experience. It is illustrated, for example, by the ubiquitous phenomenon of taking moral advice (this includes a role for exemplars of individual moral virtues, but is not limited to exemplars of virtue). In this paper, I shall defend moral deference against overblown philosophical skepticism. I hope to contribute to rehabilitating the notion for some role in moral theory.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Sreenivasan, G

Published Date

  • January 1, 2015

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 17 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 41 - 59

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1825-5167

Citation Source

  • Scopus