Naturalizing Ethics


Book Section

© 2016 John wiley & sons, inc. All rights reserved. In this chapter, we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies - Hume's and Moore's - that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why nihilism about value is not especially worrisome for ethical naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes the essence of Duke naturalism.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Flanagan, O; Sarkissian, H; Wong, D

Published Date

  • February 5, 2016

Book Title

  • The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism

Start / End Page

  • 16 - 33

International Standard Book Number 13 (ISBN-13)

  • 9781118657607

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1002/9781118657775.ch2

Citation Source

  • Scopus