The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an Illusion

Published

Journal Article

© 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Eliminativism about intentional content argues for its conclusion from the partial correctness of all three of the theses Hutto and Satne seek to combine: neo-Cartesianism is correct to this extent: if there is intentional content it must originally be mental. Neo-Behaviorism is correct to this extent: attribution of intentional content is basically a heuristic device for predicting the behavior of higher vertebrates. Neo-Pragmatism is right to this extent: the illusion of intentionality in language is the source of the illusion of intentionality in thought. Eliminativists employ the insights of all three “neo”-theses to explain why there is no such thing and why the systematic illusion that there is intentional content runs so deep.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Rosenberg, A

Published Date

  • September 1, 2015

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 43 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 537 - 547

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1574-9274

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0048-3893

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s11406-015-9624-4

Citation Source

  • Scopus