In defence of the self-stultification objection

Journal Article

© Imprint Academic, 2014. Epiphenomenalism holds that mental events are caused by physical events while not causing any physical effects whatsoever. The self-stultification objection is a venerable argument against epiphenomenalism according to which, if epiphenomenalism were true, we would not have knowledge of our own sensations. For the past three decades, W.S. Robinson has called into question the soundness of this objection, offering several arguments against it. Many of his arguments attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the opponents of epiphenomenalism, hoping to show that epiphenomenalism is no less stultifying than its contenders, such as dualism, functionalism, or identity theory. In the current paper I attempt to shift the burden of proof back to Robinson, and thus to defend the self-stultification objection, by offering two counterarguments against one of Robinson's objections to one of the key premises of the self-stultification objection.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • De Brigard, F

Published Date

  • May 1, 2014

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 21 / 5-6

Start / End Page

  • 120 - 130

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1355-8250

Citation Source

  • Scopus