Elections in double-member districts with nonseparable voter preferences

Published

Journal Article

We derive Nash equilibrium candidate strategies in a double-member district election when voters have nonseparable preferences for candidates in a single-dimensional policy space. When candidates are elected simultaneously, nonseparable voter preferences create multiple equilibria, including some in which candidates adopt extreme positions. The results are robust to limited voter uncertainty about candidate interaction in the legislature. Nonseparable voter preferences create incentives for the formation of political parties and disincentives for candidates to moderate their positions.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Lacy, D; Niou, EMS

Published Date

  • January 1, 1998

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 10 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 89 - 110

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0951-6298

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1177/0951692898010001004

Citation Source

  • Scopus