Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking


Journal Article

Arguments for rules rather than discretion in macroeconomic policymaking facilitate the understanding of some fundamental issues of democratic theory. This article reviews four such arguments, and relates them to issues of delegation and accountability in representative government. Copyright © 1992, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors


Published Date

  • January 1, 1992

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 5 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 259 - 278

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1468-0491

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0952-1895

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1111/j.1468-0491.1992.tb00040.x

Citation Source

  • Scopus