Appointments, presidential power, and the federal reserve

Published

Journal Article

The Federal Reserve is nominally independent of elected officials, but it is widely seen as being subject to presidential influence. A number of scholars who have taken this view have also identified the appointment power as the most important mechanism for the exercise of this influence. An examination of the institutional nature of the relationship between the president and the Fed casts doubt on this assertion. We argue that the president's use of this institutional prerogative, as a means of influencing Fed policy activity, is a more limited tool than previously realized.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Keech, WR; Morris, IL

Published Date

  • January 1, 1997

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 19 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 253 - 267

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0164-0704

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/S0164-0704(97)00014-1

Citation Source

  • Scopus