Policy choice as an electoral investment

Published

Journal Article

Traditional approaches to policy choice typically simplify their analysis by ignoring the question of internal constituency politics: constituencies are modelled simply as a single "generic" voter. We explicitly take into account how differential rates of participation and support by various groups in a legislator's constituency will influence the legislator's choice of policy. Viewing the choice of policy as essentially a question of redistribution of welfare, we argue that riskaverse politicians will attempt, not to be evenhanded toward all groups in their constituency, as some scholars have suggested, nor to direct benefits chiefly to swing groups, as has also been hypothesized, but rather, first and foremost, to maintain their current electoral coalition, and in particular, their "primary constituency". © 1984 Springer-Verlag.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Cox, GW; McCubbins, MD; Sullivan, T

Published Date

  • October 1, 1984

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 1 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 231 - 242

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1432-217X

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0176-1714

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/BF00433518

Citation Source

  • Scopus