Winner determination in sequential majority voting
Publication
, Conference
Lang, J; Pini, MS; Rossi, F; Venable, KB; Walsh, T
Published in: IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
December 1, 2007
Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform a sequence of pairwise majority comparisons between two candidates. The winner thus depends on the chosen sequence of comparisons, which can be represented by a binary tree. We address the difficulty of computing candidates that win for some trees, and then introduce and study the notion of fair winner, i.e. candidates who win in a balanced tree. We then consider the situation where we lack complete informations about preferences, and determine the computational complexity of computing winners in this case.
Published In
IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN
1045-0823
Publication Date
December 1, 2007
Start / End Page
1372 / 1377
Citation
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Lang, J., Pini, M. S., Rossi, F., Venable, K. B., & Walsh, T. (2007). Winner determination in sequential majority voting. In IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 1372–1377).
Lang, J., M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, and T. Walsh. “Winner determination in sequential majority voting.” In IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1372–77, 2007.
Lang J, Pini MS, Rossi F, Venable KB, Walsh T. Winner determination in sequential majority voting. In: IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2007. p. 1372–7.
Lang, J., et al. “Winner determination in sequential majority voting.” IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007, pp. 1372–77.
Lang J, Pini MS, Rossi F, Venable KB, Walsh T. Winner determination in sequential majority voting. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2007. p. 1372–1377.
Published In
IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN
1045-0823
Publication Date
December 1, 2007
Start / End Page
1372 / 1377