Winner determination in sequential majority voting


Conference Paper

Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform a sequence of pairwise majority comparisons between two candidates. The winner thus depends on the chosen sequence of comparisons, which can be represented by a binary tree. We address the difficulty of computing candidates that win for some trees, and then introduce and study the notion of fair winner, i.e. candidates who win in a balanced tree. We then consider the situation where we lack complete informations about preferences, and determine the computational complexity of computing winners in this case.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Lang, J; Pini, MS; Rossi, F; Venable, KB; Walsh, T

Published Date

  • December 1, 2007

Published In

Start / End Page

  • 1372 - 1377

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1045-0823

Citation Source

  • Scopus