Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency

Journal Article (Working Paper)

We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur, agents' uncertainty about the macroeconomy remains contained, and welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, uncertainty accelerates and welfare declines. Announcing the future policy course raises uncertainty in the short run by revealing that active inflation stabilization will be temporarily abandoned. However, this announcement reduces policy uncertainty and anchors inflationary beliefs at the end of the policy. For the U.S. enhancing transparency is found to increase welfare.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Bianchi, F; Melosi, L

Published Date

  • February 1, 2015

Published In

  • Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)


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