Skip to main content
Journal cover image

Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change

Publication ,  Journal Article
Jones Luong, P; Weinthal, E
Published in: American Political Science Review
January 1, 2004

The view of institutions as coercion rather than as contracts dominates the comparative politics literature on both institutional creation and the politics of economic reform. The emergence of a collectively optimal tax code in Russia demonstrates the limitations of this emphasis on coercion. This new tax code was not imposed by a strong central leader, mandated by international institutions, or the result of state capture by powerful economic interest groups. Rather, it is the product of a mutually beneficial exchange between the Russian government and the Russian oil companies. Russia's ability to negotiate an effective tax regime also suggests the conditions under which and the microcausal mechanism whereby exogenous shocks promote institutional change and economic reform. Owing to their mutual vulnerability and interdependence, the August 1998 financial crisis generated widely shared perceptions among these actors that the payoffs of cooperation had changed. Yet the economic reform institution that resulted required a series of incremental strategic moves that established common knowledge.

Duke Scholars

Published In

American Political Science Review

DOI

EISSN

1537-5943

ISSN

0003-0554

Publication Date

January 1, 2004

Volume

98

Issue

1

Start / End Page

139 / 152

Related Subject Headings

  • Political Science & Public Administration
  • 4408 Political science
  • 1606 Political Science
 

Citation

APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Jones Luong, P., & Weinthal, E. (2004). Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change. American Political Science Review, 98(1), 139–152. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404001054
Jones Luong, P., and E. Weinthal. “Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change.” American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 139–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404001054.
Jones Luong P, Weinthal E. Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change. American Political Science Review. 2004 Jan 1;98(1):139–52.
Jones Luong, P., and E. Weinthal. “Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change.” American Political Science Review, vol. 98, no. 1, Jan. 2004, pp. 139–52. Scopus, doi:10.1017/s0003055404001054.
Jones Luong P, Weinthal E. Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change. American Political Science Review. 2004 Jan 1;98(1):139–152.
Journal cover image

Published In

American Political Science Review

DOI

EISSN

1537-5943

ISSN

0003-0554

Publication Date

January 1, 2004

Volume

98

Issue

1

Start / End Page

139 / 152

Related Subject Headings

  • Political Science & Public Administration
  • 4408 Political science
  • 1606 Political Science