Computing equilibria with partial commitment

Published

Conference Paper

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2016. In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender’s actions and learn her distribution over actions, before acting himself. If the actions were not observable, Nash (or perhaps correlated) equilibrium would arguably be a more natural solution concept. But what if some, but not all, aspects of the defender’s actions are observable? In this paper, we introduce solution concepts corresponding to this case, both with and without correlation. We study their basic properties, whether these solutions can be efficiently computed, and the impact of additional observability on the utility obtained.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • January 1, 2016

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 10123 LNCS /

Start / End Page

  • 1 - 14

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1611-3349

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0302-9743

International Standard Book Number 13 (ISBN-13)

  • 9783662541098

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_1

Citation Source

  • Scopus