A capture theory of committees

Published

Journal Article

© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. Why do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue that they may also serve to discourage outside influence or capture by raising its cost. As such, committees may contain members who are uninformed or who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger when outsiders have larger stakes in its decision or contribute lower-quality proposals, or when its members are more corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes helps deter capture.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Name-Correa, AJ; Yildirim, H

Published Date

  • October 1, 2018

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 177 / 1-2

Start / End Page

  • 135 - 154

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1573-7101

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0048-5829

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s11127-018-0593-6

Citation Source

  • Scopus