Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information
Publication
, Journal Article
Ambrus, A; Chaney, E; Salitskiy, I
Published in: Quantitative Economics
March 1, 2018
We investigate the effect of delay on prices in bargaining situations using a data set containing thousands of captives ransomed from Barbary pirates between 1575 and 1692. Plausibly exogenous variation in the delay in ransoming provides evidence that negotiating delays decreased the size of ransom payments, and that much of the effect stems from the signalling value of strategic delay, in accordance with theoretical predictions. We also structurally estimate a version of the screening type bargaining model, adjusted to our context, and find that the model fits both the observed prices and acceptance probabilities well.
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Published In
Quantitative Economics
DOI
EISSN
1759-7331
ISSN
1759-7323
Publication Date
March 1, 2018
Volume
9
Issue
1
Start / End Page
217 / 246
Related Subject Headings
- 3802 Econometrics
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1403 Econometrics
Citation
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Chicago
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Ambrus, A., Chaney, E., & Salitskiy, I. (2018). Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information. Quantitative Economics, 9(1), 217–246. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE655
Ambrus, A., E. Chaney, and I. Salitskiy. “Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information.” Quantitative Economics 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 217–46. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE655.
Ambrus A, Chaney E, Salitskiy I. Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information. Quantitative Economics. 2018 Mar 1;9(1):217–46.
Ambrus, A., et al. “Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information.” Quantitative Economics, vol. 9, no. 1, Mar. 2018, pp. 217–46. Scopus, doi:10.3982/QE655.
Ambrus A, Chaney E, Salitskiy I. Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information. Quantitative Economics. 2018 Mar 1;9(1):217–246.
Published In
Quantitative Economics
DOI
EISSN
1759-7331
ISSN
1759-7323
Publication Date
March 1, 2018
Volume
9
Issue
1
Start / End Page
217 / 246
Related Subject Headings
- 3802 Econometrics
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1403 Econometrics