Journal Article

This article discusses how the analysis of Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) on the identification power of equilibrium in games can be extended to supermodular games. These games embody models that exhibit strategic complementarity, an important and empirically relevant class of economic models. In these games, the extreme points of the Nash equilibrium and rationalizable strategy sets coincide. We discuss how this result facilitates a comparative analysis of the relative identification power of equilibrium and weaker notions of rational behavior. As an illustrative example, we consider a differentiated product oligopoly pricing game in which firms' prices are strategic complements. © 2008 American Statistical Association.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Molinari, F; Rosen, AM

Published Date

  • July 1, 2008

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 26 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 297 - 302

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0735-0015

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1198/073500108000000088

Citation Source

  • Scopus