Disarmament games

Published

Conference Paper

Copyright © 2017, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. Much recent work in the AI community concerns algorithms for computing optimal mixed strategies to commit to, as well as the deployment of such algorithms in real security applications. Another possibility is to commit not to play certain actions. If only one player makes such a commitment, then this is generally less powerful than completely committing to a single mixed strategy. However, if players can alternatingly commit not to play certain actions and thereby iteratively reduce their strategy spaces, then desirable outcomes can be obtained that would not have been possible with just a single player committing to a mixed strategy. We refer to such a setting as a disarmament game. In this paper, we study disarmament for two-player normal-form games. We show that deciding whether an outcome can be obtained with disarmament is NP-complete (even for a fixed number of rounds), if only pure strategies can be removed. On the other hand, for the case where mixed strategies can be removed, we provide a folk theorem that shows that all desirable utility profiles can be obtained, and give an efficient algorithm for (approximately) obtaining them.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Deng, Y; Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • January 1, 2017

Published In

  • 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017

Start / End Page

  • 473 - 479

Citation Source

  • Scopus