Fair and efficient social choice in dynamic settings

Published

Conference Paper

We study a dynamic social choice problem in which an alternative is chosen at each round according to the reported valuations of a set of agents. In the interests of obtaining a solution that is both efficient and fair, we aim to maximize the long-term Nash welfare, which is the product of all agents' utilities. We present and analyze two greedy algorithms for this problem, including the classic Proportional Fair (PF) algorithm. We analyze several versions of the algorithms and how they relate, and provide an axiomatization of PF. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms on data gathered from a computer systems application.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Freeman, R; Zahedi, SM; Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • January 1, 2017

Published In

Start / End Page

  • 4580 - 4587

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1045-0823

International Standard Book Number 13 (ISBN-13)

  • 9780999241103

Citation Source

  • Scopus