The welfare effects of coordinated assignment: Evidence from the New York city high school match

Published

Journal Article

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Abdulkadiroǧlu, A; Agarwal, N; Pathak, PA

Published Date

  • December 1, 2017

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 107 / 12

Start / End Page

  • 3635 - 3689

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0002-8282

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1257/aer.20151425

Citation Source

  • Scopus