Empirical work on auctions of multiple objects

Published

Journal Article

© 2018 American Economic Association. All rights reserved. Abundant data has led to new opportunities for empirical auctions research in recent years, with much of the newest work on auctions of multiple objects, including: (1) auctions of ranked objects (such as sponsored search ads), (2) auctions of identical objects (such as Treasury bonds), and (3) auctions of dissimilar objects (such as FCC spectrum licenses). This paper surveys recent developments in the empirical analysis of such auctions.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Hortaçsu, A; McAdams, D

Published Date

  • March 1, 2018

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 56 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 157 - 184

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-0515

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1257/jel.20160961

Citation Source

  • Scopus