Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem”

Accepted

Journal Article

© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. Gordon Tullock developed an approach to understanding dynamic processes of political change and policy outcomes. The key insight is the notion that political insiders have a comparative advantage—because they face lower transaction costs—in manipulating rules. The result is that political actors can collect revenues from threatening to restrict, or offering to loosen, access to valuable permissions, permits, or services. To the extent that the ability to pay for such favorable treatment is a consequence of private activities that produce greater social value, there is a “political Coase theorem”: corruption makes bad systems more efficient. But the dynamic consequences are extremely negative, because of the inability to institute reforms resulting from application of Tullock’s “transitional gains trap.”.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Munger, MC

Published Date

  • October 1, 2019

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 181 / 1-2

Start / End Page

  • 83 - 100

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1573-7101

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0048-5829

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s11127-018-0610-9

Citation Source

  • Scopus