Stubborn mining: Generalizing selfish mining and combining with an eclipse attack

Conference Paper

Selfish mining, originally discovered by Eyal et al. [9], is a well-known attack where a selfish miner, under certain conditions, can gain a disproportionate share of reward by deviating from the honest behavior. In this paper, we expand the mining strategy space to include novel "stubborn" strategies that, for a large range of parameters, earn the miner more revenue. Consequently, we show that the selfish mining attack is not (in general) optimal. Further, we show how a miner can further amplify its gain by non-trivially composing mining attacks with network-level eclipse attacks. We show, surprisingly, that given the attacker's best strategy, in some cases victims of an eclipse attack can actually benefit from being eclipsed!

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Nayak, K; Kumar, S; Miller, A; Shi, E

Published Date

  • May 9, 2016

Published In

  • Proceedings 2016 Ieee European Symposium on Security and Privacy, Euro S and P 2016

Start / End Page

  • 305 - 320

International Standard Book Number 13 (ISBN-13)

  • 9781509017515

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1109/EuroSP.2016.32

Citation Source

  • Scopus