The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies

Published

Journal Article

© 2019 INFORMS While the computational complexity of many game-theoretic solution concepts, notably Nash equilibrium, has now been settled, the question of determining the exact complexity of computing an evolutionarily stable strategy has resisted solution since attention was drawn to it in 2004. In this paper, I settle this question by proving that deciding the existence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is ΣP2 complete.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • January 1, 2019

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 44 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 783 - 792

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1526-5471

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0364-765X

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1287/moor.2018.0945

Citation Source

  • Scopus