Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability

Published

Journal Article

© 2019 Elsevier B.V. In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally compare the institution of democratic punishment, where members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, with individual peer-to-peer and dictatorial punishment institutions. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions. A comparison with dictatorial punishment suggests that the effect relative to traditional peer-to-peer punishment primarily works by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member's contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Ambrus, A; Greiner, B

Published Date

  • October 1, 2019

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 178 /

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0047-2727

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104053

Citation Source

  • Scopus