Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions

Journal Article (Journal Article)

Clock auctions have a number of properties that make them attractive for practical purposes. They are weakly group strategy-proof, make bidding truthfully an obviously dominant strategy, and preserve trading agents' privacy. However, optimal reserve prices and stopping rules depend on the details of underlying distributions, and so clock auctions have proved challenging to implement in a prior-free, asymptotically optimal way. In this paper, we develop a prior-free clock auction that is asymptotically optimal by exploiting a relationship between hazard rates and the spacings between order statistics. Extensions permit price discrimination among heterogeneous groups, minimum revenue thresholds, and quantity caps.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Loertscher, S; Marx, LM

Published Date

  • May 1, 2020

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 187 /

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1095-7235

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-0531

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030

Citation Source

  • Scopus