Group Fairness in Committee Selection

Conference Paper

In this article, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all these voters strictly prefer the new committee to the existing one. Our main contribution is to extend this definition to stability of a distribution (or lottery) over committees. We consider two canonical voter preference models: the Approval Set setting where each voter approves a set of candidates and prefers committees with larger intersection with this set; and the Ranking Representative setting where each voter ranks committees based on how much she likes her favorite candidate in a committee. Our main result is to show that stable lotteries always exist for these canonical preference models. Interestingly, given preferences of voters over committees, the procedure for computing an approximately stable lottery is the same for both models and therefore extends to the setting where some voters have the former preference structure and others have the latter. Our existence proof uses the probabilistic method and a new large deviation inequality that may be of independent interest.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Cheng, Y; Jiang, Z; Munagala, K; Wang, K

Published Date

  • November 1, 2020

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 8 / 4

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 2167-8383

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 2167-8375

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1145/3417750

Citation Source

  • Scopus