Moral framing effects within subjects

Journal Article (Journal Article)

Several philosophers and psychologists have argued that evidence of moral framing effects shows that many of our moral judgments are unreliable. However, all previous empirical work on moral framing effects has used between-subject experimental designs. We argue that between-subject designs alone do not allow us to accurately estimate the extent of moral framing effects or to properly evaluate the case from framing effects against the reliability of our moral judgments. To do better, we report results of our new within-subject study on four types of moral framing effects, and we discuss the implications of our findings for the reliability of moral judgments. Overall, our results strengthen the evidence from moral framing effects against the reliability of some of our moral judgments.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Rehren, P; Sinnott-Armstrong, W

Published Date

  • January 1, 2021

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 34 / 5

Start / End Page

  • 611 - 636

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1465-394X

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0951-5089

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1080/09515089.2021.1914328

Citation Source

  • Scopus