Strategizing in small group decision-making: Host state identification for radioactive waste disposal among eight southern states

Journal Article (Journal Article)

Experimental work in economics has long focussed attention on strategic interaction amongst individuals. A robust result is that a large fraction of participants in public goods experiments act cooperatively. This paper tests for the extent of strategic behavior in a non-laboratory setting. These data were generated when representatives from eight southeastern states voted to identify one state as host for a regional disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste. We find that no state plays its dominant (free-riding) strategy, but none plays in a completely cooperative fashion either. This result is similar to that found in laboratory public goods experiments. © 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Coates, D; Munger, MC

Published Date

  • January 1, 1995

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 82 / 1-2

Start / End Page

  • 1 - 15

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1573-7101

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0048-5829

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/BF01047726

Citation Source

  • Scopus