Strong cognitivist weaknesses

Journal Article (Journal Article)

Marušić & Schwenkler (Analytic Philosophy, 59, 309) offer a simple and elegant defense of strong cognitivism about intention: the view that an intention to φ is a form of belief that one will φ. I show that their defense fails: however simple and elegant, it fails to account for various aspects about intention and its expression, and faces distinctive challenges of its own, including a dilemma and counterexample. These also undermine Marušić & Schwenkler's claim to a best-explanation type of account and recommend alternatives to strong cognitivism altogether.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Hauthaler, N

Published Date

  • January 1, 2022

Published In

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 2153-960X

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 2153-9596

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1111/phib.12252

Citation Source

  • Scopus