The Logic of Conditional Belief

Journal Article

AbstractThe logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the Ramseyan indicative conditional.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Eva, B

Published Date

  • September 17, 2020

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 70 / 281

Start / End Page

  • 759 - 779

Published By

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1467-9213

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0031-8094

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1093/pq/pqaa008


  • en