A computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental aid

Journal Article (Journal Article)

This paper introduces a theoretical and a calibrated computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental relations in which heterogeneous agents (i) are endowed with income and houses, (ii) are fully mobile between multiple jurisdictions, and (iii) vote in both local and state elections to determine local property and state income tax rates. Three different types of intergovernmental programs are analyzed: (i) redistributive revenue sharing, (ii) district power equalization and (iii) deductibility of local taxes. The approach facilitates a heretofore difficult comparative analysis in that it provides for an integrated investigation of these programs in a single general equilibrium model.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Nechyba, T

Published Date

  • January 1, 1996

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 62 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 363 - 397

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0047-2727

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01565-5

Citation Source

  • Scopus