Term limits as a response to incumbency advantage

Published

Journal Article

In this paper we develop a spatial model to provide an explanation for the seeming paradox that voters in some states reelect incumbents while unilaterally self-imposing legislative term limits. The model shows that voters are more likely to support term limits if the incumbent's position is farther from the median voter position or if the incumbent's party is more moderate. Furthermore, it suggests that term limits, or the threat of term limits, increases the responsiveness of politicians' policy platforms. © 2005 Southern Political Science Association.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Chen, KP; Niou, EMS

Published Date

  • May 1, 2005

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 67 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 390 - 406

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-3816

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00322.x

Citation Source

  • Scopus