External threat and collective action

Published

Journal Article

This article studies how players allocate their endowed resources between productive and conflictual activities in the context of rivalry between two groups. We show that the suboptimality and exploitation propositions established by Olson (1965) do not necessarily apply when external threat is endogenized. We also illustrate that it does not always pay to take an offensive stance. When competing with an offensive group, it might be better for members of a defensive group to remain defensive. Furthermore, in the context of rivalry between two groups, free riding can actually benefit everyone in the system. (JEL D70, D74). © Western Economic Association International.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Niou, EMS; Tan, G

Published Date

  • July 1, 2005

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 43 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 519 - 530

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1465-7295

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0095-2583

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1093/ei/cbi035

Citation Source

  • Scopus