Bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium


Journal Article

Recent papers have established that bicameralism can support a non-empty core in majority voting games in two dimensional policy spaces. We generalise this result to the n-dimensional case, and provide a discussion of multi-cameralism. Bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable equilibria by institutionalising opposition between mutually oriented median voters, this provides a clear link with the standard median voter model and with more traditional analyses of bicameralism. © 1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Brennan, G; Hamlin, A

Published Date

  • September 1, 1992

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 74 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 169 - 179

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1573-7101

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0048-5829

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/BF00140765

Citation Source

  • Scopus