Adverse selection: does it preclude a competitive health insurance market?

Published

Journal Article

In sum, although fixed dollar subsidies have the great virtue of ferreting out cross subsidies, society may not be satisfied with the results. The scenario described by Marquis is only one of many. People seem to want lifetime insurance offering low premiums if things go bad rather than premiums that change annually as health outcomes are realized [see, e.g., Light (1992)]. But nondiversible risk may be too great for a market in life contracts to exist.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Sloan, FA

Published Date

  • October 1992

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 11 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 353 - 356

PubMed ID

  • 10122544

Pubmed Central ID

  • 10122544

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1879-1646

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-6296

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/0167-6296(92)90009-p

Language

  • eng