Uncertainty, information and resolution of medical malpractice disputes

Journal Article (Journal Article)

This study assesses the role of defendant liability in determining whether the plaintiff receives payment, relationship of compensation to economic loss, and stage of dispute resolution. An options pricing model explains how information acquired affects both decisions to drop or continue and settlement values, as well as the role of pecuniary motives for claiming. Cases in which a panel of physician evaluators thought defendant(s) to be innocent were much more likely to be dropped, as were cases in which innocence became more apparent as the case developed. Compensation was much less than economic loss on average. Questionable defendant liability meant reduced compensation. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Sloan, FA; Hoerger, TJ

Published Date

  • December 1, 1991

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 4 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 403 - 423

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1573-0476

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0895-5646

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/BF00056164

Citation Source

  • Scopus