Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks

Journal Article (Journal Article)

This paper studies competition in a network and how a network structure determines agents' individual payoffs. It constructs a general model of competition that can serve as a reduced form for specific models. The paper shows how agents' outside options, and hence their shares of surplus, derive from "opportunity paths" connecting them to direct and indirect alternative exchanges. Analyzing these paths, results show how third parties' links affect different agents' bargaining power. Even distant links may have large effects on agents' earnings. These payoff results, and the identification of the paths themselves, should prove useful to further analysis of network structure. © Springer-Verlag 2000.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Kranton, RE; Minehart, DF

Published Date

  • January 1, 2000

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 5 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 301 - 331

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1434-4742

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/PL00013691

Citation Source

  • Scopus