Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral Motivation

In some recent work I have developed a theory of moral reasons and their relation to the agent’s motivations. The theory is naturalistic in its approach, meaning that it seeks to integrate a conception of what moral reasons are and how they motivate with the best and most relevant science we currently have. I here develop my theory of moral reasons in relation to some of the most recent work in psychology on the nature of emotion and the ways in which it both underpins and undermines cognition. While the results in these fields are still evolving and to a degree speculative, there is enough there that ought to command the attention of philosophers with a naturalistic bent, and to challenge philosophers who do not possess such a bent. I also apply my theory of moral reasons to a real life case in which emotionally charged cognition changes a person’s motivations.

Duke Scholars

Author David B. Wong Philosophy